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and the reason is easy to see. Antitrust law aims to protect consumers from the consequences of
monopolization. Intellectual property law seeks to enhance incentives to innovate by granting
monopolies in ideas or expressions of ideas. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the
purported conflict between antitrust and intellectual property. The chapter is largely descriptive,
and focuses on current or developing litigation rather than historical controversies. Many of the
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1. Introduction

Intellectual property law and antitrust have been described as conflicting bodies of law (Carrier,
2002; Bowman, 1973; Baxter, 1966; Kaplow 1984; Cheng, 2013), and the reason for such a
characterization is easy to see. Antitrust law, described simply, aims to protect consumers from
the consequences of monopolization. Intellectual property law, in contrast, seeks to enhance
incentives to innovate by granting monopolies in ideas or expressions of ideas. This is an overly
simplistic description of both types of law, and the apparent tension I have described is due in
part to simplistic framing.
More subtle descriptions of the law have suggested that the conflict between antitrust and
intellectual property is mostly superficial. Perhaps the most prominent of these more
sophisticated descriptions argues that the conflict between antitrust and intellectual property is
just a short run phenomenon. Antitrust and intellectual property are in conflict in the short run,
under this view, but not in the long run. In the long run, both areas of the law attempt to
maximize the set of choices available to consumers.
Another effort to reconcile antitrust and intellectual property rejects the short-run versus long-run
distinction and holds that the tensions result mostly from misapplications of the law, even in the
short run (Cass & Hylton, 2013). Under this view, there should be no conflict in an ideal legal
system. Both types of law strive toward optimal tradeoffs between the maintenance of
innovation incentives and the protection of consumers. If those tradeoffs are managed correctly
in each case, in a manner that maximizes society’s welfare, the same results should be achieved
under both types of law. Since law is far from perfect in application, however, conflicts arise.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore the purported conflict between antitrust and intellectual
property. The chapter is largely descriptive, and focuses on current or developing litigation
rather than historical controversies. Many of the modern examples of conflict can be attributed
to problems of classification. The general trend has been to reclassify issues that were once
considered solely within the province of patent law as antitrust issues.
In Part 2 below, I present a straightforward discussion of the economics of intellectual property
and antitrust law. I show that the tension between antitrust and intellectual property law can be
viewed within a common economic framework. Part 3 presents modern examples of the patentantitrust conflict.

2. Economics

I will start with an exploration of the basic economics of antitrust and intellectual property,
separately. My hope is to use economics to offer a simple and reasonably rigorous account of
the potential scope of conflict between antitrust and intellectual property.
1

2.1 Antitrust
To simplify matters, I will treat monopolization as the same whether it occurs through unilateral
action or through cartel activity. When a single firm monopolizes, it excludes competitors and
takes the market to itself, raising price to the monopolistic price level and cutting output back to
the monopolistic quantity. When a group of firms forms a cartel, the effect is the same. The
cartel raises price and cuts output to the monopolistic price-output combination.
Figure 1 shows the familiar welfare consequences of monopolization. The downward sloping
line represents the demand for the good, with quantity measured along the horizontal access and
price measured along the vertical axis. The marginal cost of production is shown by the flat line
– for simplicity, I assume constant marginal cost. In a competitive market, price would equal
marginal cost. The diagram shows that the monopolizing firm exploits its monopoly power by
cutting output and increasing price from the competitive level, p 1 , to the monopoly level, p 2 . As
a result, society loses the surplus from goods that are no longer sold to consumers, represented
by the area labeled Social Loss. Also, some of the surplus that had been enjoyed by consumers
under competition is transferred to the monopolist, shown by the area labeled Transfer.
In view of the welfare consequences of monopolization, antitrust laws have been justified by two
arguments. One, the most important, holds that antitrust is necessary to prevent the waste of
resources that monopoly generates (Posner, 2001). In terms of the diagram (Figure1), then, the
purpose of antitrust is to prevent the area labeled Social Loss from arising. Under this view,
antitrust is justifiable because it enhances society’s welfare (or wealth), if employed judiciously.
An alternative justification for antitrust emphasizes the distribution of wealth. Since the
monopolizing entity transfers part of the surplus that would have gone to consumers to itself,
monopolization transfers wealth between groups in society. Assuming consumers to be more
numerous than the owners of the firm, the transfer of surplus enriches a relatively small class
(owners) at the expense of a larger class (consumers). There is no clear theoretical basis for
preferring one distribution of resources to another, as long as the total amount of resources is the
same. However, a simple Benthamite approach to utility, assuming everyone has the same
marginal utility of income, suggests that welfare would be enhanced by shifting the money back
from owners to consumers.
I will adhere to the generally accepted approach and treat total resources, rather than the
distribution of resources, as the major concern of antitrust law. Thus, monopolization is
undesirable because it reduces society’s total wealth, not because of its distributional impact.

2

Figure 1: Welfare consequences of monopolization.
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2.2 Intellectual Property
Figure 1 can be used to set out the economic basis for intellectual property laws. Consider a
product that has been patented. The patent allows the patentee to exclude competition. Since
competition is excluded by the patent, the patentee can raise price above the competitive level. If
the competitive level would be p 1 , the patentee may raise the price to p 2 . The result is the same
as in the monopolization scenario described earlier. Some of the welfare of consumers is
transferred to the patentee (Transfer). Some of the welfare is forfeited (Social Loss).
Of course, the immediate question this generates is: why ever award a patent given the harmful
effects just described? The answer is that the patent, under the appropriate conditions,
incentivizes the producer to introduce the product into the market. In other words, without the
patent grant, the good would not exist on the market. If this is valid, then how does society gain
from the patent grant? Society’s potential gain from the patent grant is the whole surplus
triangle shown in Figure 1, which is the sum of the Social Loss, Transfer, and Residual Surplus.
Once the patent is granted and the firm responds by raising its price, the amount society actually
gains is the sum of the Transfer and the Residual Surplus. The patentee takes the entire transfer
as his own, and consumers receive the residual surplus.
Note that under this theory, the Social Loss identified as the key justification for enforcing the
antitrust laws does not exist as a practical matter in the patent setting. The reason is that in the
absence of the patent, the surplus would not have been available to consumers at all. Hence the
real gain to society from the patent is the sum of the transfer and the residual surplus. Society
has not suffered a loss as a result of patent monopolization because the additional surplus
represented by the Social Loss triangle would not have been available to consumers in the
absence of the patent grant.
One might object to this argument by noting that it might be possible to have the patent grant
without the patent-induced price rise. Supposing that it is possible to have the patent without the
price increase – that is, the patentee might be awarded a patent and forgo the increase in price
from p 1 to p 2 – then it would seem to follow that the entire loss in welfare resulting from the
price rise should be counted as a loss to society. Under this assumption, the analysis of welfare
under intellectual property is the same as that under antitrust. But this view ignores the
underlying premise that the patent is necessary to generate the innovation. If the patent is
necessary to generate the innovation, then in the absence of the prospect of a patent-induced
price rise, the incentive to patent would not have existed. The patent and the resultant increase
from p 1 to p 2 cannot be separated under the starting premise of this analysis.
A compromise between these conflicting views – one viewing intellectual property as entirely
beneficial and the other viewing intellectual property as a harmful form of monopolization –
might be reached by modifying the premise of this discussion slightly and assuming that a
particular price increase was necessary to bring the innovation to market, but that the increase
from p 1 to p 2 is greater than that necessary price increase. Under this view, part of the area
labeled social loss could then be described as a waste of society’s resources. The patent was too
generous. The patentee would have brought innovation to market with a smaller reward. The
4

loss in welfare resulting from the differential between p 2 and the necessary price (or minimum
necessary innovation-inducing price) would then represent a genuine loss to society’s welfare.
Under this view, one can argue that there is a tradeoff between consumer welfare protection and
incentivizing innovation – and indeed a conflict between antitrust and patent law.
Many scholars have addressed the tradeoff between consumer welfare protection and
incentivizing innovation, mostly in connection with the patent-antitrust conflict. Carrier
provides a useful survey (Carrier, 2002), and groups the arguments into three general categories.
One is the position taken by Ward Bowman (1973), which is that legal policy should aim to
maximize the reward generated by the competitive advantage provided by the patent. This view
is consistent, very generally, with permitting the patentee to obtain the entire transfer, and
perhaps the entire potential surplus in a system of perfect price discrimination. A second view,
attributed to Baxter (1966), seeks to minimize the social loss due to patent protection. Thus, as
long as the reward is sufficient to bring the innovation to market, the goal should be to minimize
the social loss resulting from the patent-induced price increase. The third position, attributed to
Kaplow (1984), holds that policy should aim to vary the extent of antitrust regulation of patentee
conduct as the ratio of the reward form the patent (that is, the transfer) to the social loss changes.
Thus, as the reward increases relative to the social loss, patent protection should be given more
weight as a policy goal relative to the consumer protection goal. Carrier noted, interestingly, that
patent protection should also vary with the responsiveness of innovation to such protection –
which implies an industry-specific approach to trading off patent and antitrust law. 1

3. Applications
In the abstract, it seems that the conflict between patent and antitrust law should be pervasive.
Under the general theory outlined above, the controversy potentially exists as long as the
patentee receives a reward that is greater than the minimum necessary for the patentee to bring
the innovation into existence. However, this condition is likely to hold for many if not all
patents. The ideas that do not come to market as patents fail because the patent reward was less
than the cost of creation. The ideas that succeed, by becoming valuable patents, are those for
which the patent reward exceeds the cost of creation. It should be the rare instance where the
reward was just sufficient to cover the cost of creation. Given this, it would appear that almost
every patent represents a potential instance of a patent-antitrust conflict, because the reward
probably could have been reduced at least slightly while maintaining the incentive to bring the
innovation to market (Ayres & Klemperer, 1999).
Although this view appears to be well received, it is somewhat static and backward looking.
Suppose, for example, the reward is fixed at $100, and the cost of innovation is random (Hylton
& Lin, 2014). Innovation occurs whenever the realized innovation cost is less than the fixed
reward. Under this simple model of innovation, any reduction in the reward will generate less
1

Carrier (2002) at 790 (noting that there should be “differentiated analysis between industries in which patents are
essentials for innovation (e.g. chemicals) and industries in which competition (and not patents) is essential for
innovation (e.g. software)”).
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innovation. Although some innovations would have occurred with a smaller reward – for
example, the cost of innovation was only $50 – there would always exist innovation that occurs
on the innovation-incentivizing frontier – that is, where the cost of innovation is $99.99. If one
could identify the innovations that would have occurred with a smaller reward and force a price
reduction for those patents only, consumer welfare could enhanced. But the difficulty is
identifying the subset of innovations that fall in this category. An error in identifying this subset
of cases would generate a general reduction in the incentive to innovate.
Still, accepting this theory of tradeoff as the fundamental basis for the using antitrust law to
control the conduct of patentees, there are major concepts in antitrust law that limit the scope of
antitrust law’s application to the conduct of a patentee. For unilateral conduct, there are two
general antitrust “constraints” of this sort. The first is the general idea of market power, and the
second is the distinction between exclusion of competition and exploitation of monopoly power.
For collusive conduct, antitrust requires proof of agreement.
The concepts of market power and exploitation are most important in this context. In general,
for unilateral conduct to be unlawful under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the defendant firm
must have monopoly power (U.S. v. Grinnell Corp., 570 (“The offense of monopoly under s 2 of
the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power . . . .”)). 2 Moreover, it is lawful for a
monopolist to exploit its monopoly by charging the monopoly price and producing the
monopolistic quantity. The monopolist violates antitrust law only by excluding competitors.
Market power is a rather elusive concept in antitrust. Generally, it is considered the power to
raise price significantly above the competitive level (Hylton, 2003). The definition implies that
competition is too weak to prevent the firm from imposing its desired price increase on
consumers. Market power, in short, is the power to raise price above the competitive level
without having to worry too much about the constraints imposed by competition. A monopolist
can raise price at will, but will restrain himself to some degree by the loss in sales that results as
fewer consumers prefer to purchase the product. A firm in a perfectly competitive market can
raise price, but will lose all of its sales to rivals. Monopoly power is the intermediate status,
reached before full monopolization, where the firm that raises its price anticipates losing
consumers mostly because of their willingness to pay and not because of their ease of switching
to a rival with a reasonable substitute.
The market power requirement clearly should constrain the extent to which antitrust law applies
to intellectual property. Most patents exclude competition within the scope of the patent without
creating monopoly power. The reason is that, for such patents, there are substitute technologies
that a potential implementer or consumer could turn to if the patentee tries to raise the price.
These substitutes constrain the patentee’s ability to profitably impose a price increase on
implementers or consumers.
The Supreme Court in Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., held that in the tying
context no violation of the antitrust laws could be shown in the absence of proof of market power
2

See generally, Hylton (2003) at 186-202.
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in the patented product. The opinion rejects the pre-existing presumption that a patent confers
market power on the patentee. The reasoning of Independent Ink implies more generally that
market power is a necessary condition for a monopolization claim to be successful based on a
theory that the patentee leveraged the exclusionary power of the patent.
The Supreme Court’s abandonment of the patent-market-power presumption in Independent Ink
implies that unilateral conduct claims founded on the theory that the patentee leveraged the
exclusivity of the patent to exclude a rival or to constrain competition in some other market
would be unsuccessful under the Sherman Act. In spite of this, at least one special rule
originally based on the leverage theory, though falling under the label “patent misuse,” was
recently upheld by the Court. In Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, the Court reaffirmed the rule
of Brulotte v. Thys (31, patentee’s use of a royalty agreement that projects beyond the expiration
date of the patent is unlawful per se), under which a patentee cannot charge royalties that extend
beyond the term of the patent. Kimble argued that the Brulotte rule reflected a settled judicial
interpretation of the Patent Act, and that such an interpretation should remain in force unless
strong reasons could be marshalled for overturning it. The majority in Kimble believed that
strong reasons had not been provided for overturning Brulotte. The error in Kimble was the
Court’s failure to see that the leveraging theory upon which Brulotte had been based had been
firmly rejected in Independent Ink.
The more significant issue generated by Kimble is one of categorization. Although Independent
Ink limits the scope of antitrust theories based on leveraging the exclusionary power of the
patent, courts may fail to notice or explicitly acknowledge when such a theory is brought before
them. The majority in Kimble had been persuaded that the core issue of the case was one of
statutory interpretation, and viewed Congress’s failure to explicitly overturn Brulotte as an
implicit legislative enactment of the Brulotte rule. Such categorization gamesmanship can
always be played by litigants. This leaves open the question of how far courts will go in
applying Independent Ink to theories of leverage directed toward patentees. The Court may
continue to claim fidelity to Independent Ink while at the same time opting to avoid the
leveraging question in particular patent cases and to focus on some tangential legal issue (such as
statutory interpretation).
A more direct antitrust attack on patenting activity is represented by the developing law on
“product hopping” (Hovenkamp, Janis & Lemley, 2010; Carrier, 2010; Cheng, 2008). The
product hopping charge is asserted against a pharmaceutical firm with a patented drug on the
theory that the firm sought or obtained a new patent based on a minor reformulation of the drug
for the purpose of eliminating generic competition. The monopoly power of the pharmaceutical
drug is likely to be easily established, so the rule of Independent Ink would not present an
obstacle to such a claim. 3 Moreover, unlike the leveraging cases, which are based on the theory
that the monopolist seeks to extend monopoly power into a related market, the product hopping
3

Of course, the monopoly power of the drug may not be easily proven in some cases. For example, if the particular
drug faces competition from substitutes that may be nearly as effective for the particular treatment required, then a
defendant pharmaceutical firm may be able to present sufficient evidence of competition to avoid a finding of
monopoly power. On the analysis of monopoly power, see Hylton (2003) at 232-239.
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claims assert that the pharmaceutical firm has violated the antitrust law by abusing its monopoly
power, within the monopolized market, by enforcing its new patent.
At present, the most important court decision on product hopping is New York v. Actavis. New
York v. Actavis applies the balancing framework for monopolization claims established in U.S. v.
Microsoft (Microsoft III). Under the Microsoft III balancing test, the Court must compare the
anticompetitive effects of the defendant’s conduct to the procompetitive or efficiency benefits
resulting from it. Using this reasoning, the Second Circuit held that a “hard switch” – that is, a
change in the formulation of the drug which accompanies a termination of sales of the original
formulation – violates the antitrust laws if the change in the formulation appears to offer little
that was not provided by the original formulation. The Second Circuit rejected the alternative
approach of the Ninth Circuit in Allied Orthopedic Appliances Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group
LP., which refuses to balance competitive effects in the context of a predatory innovation claim.
Under Tyco, which rejects the Microsoft III balancing approach, any significant enhancement of
utility to consumers would be sufficient to defeat an antitrust claim based on a theory of
predatory innovation.
Although the product hopping case law is still in development, and the issue has not yet reached
the Supreme Court, it represents the most direct conflict one could imagine between the patent
and the antitrust laws. Under the balancing test adopted in New York v. Actavis, courts are, in
effect, directed to balance the interests of the patent laws against the interests of the antitrust
laws. One could argue that the proper forum for striking such a balance would be within a claim
for patent infringement. The defendant in such a case would typically argue that the patent is
invalid. One reason a court might find a patent invalid is that it fails the novelty or
nonobviousness requirements. 4 If a reformulation of a drug is a trivial alteration of the original
formulation, then the new patent should be found invalid because of its obviousness. In this
sense, patent law has always incorporated a direct mechanism for examining antitrust-based
theories (Cass & Hylton, 2013). However, New York v. Actavis essentially gives the infringing
party an alternative route to challenge the patent and to seek a treble damages award from the
patentee.
One can view New York v. Actavis as raising a similar categorization question to that generated
by Kimble. A decision by a patentee to abandon exploitation of a previous patent and to put his
entire resources into the exploitation of a new patent would seem to be well within the rights
protected by the patent laws. Indeed, the patent-as-property theory adopted by the Supreme
Court in Bement v. National Harrow would seem to provide sufficient legal basis for such a
decision. However, the product hopping cases view the decision to abandon and old patent and
shift resources to a new one as simply a competitive stratagem falling well within the scope of
the antitrust laws.
Apart from unilateral conduct antitrust theories, antitrust law has also been used to attack
settlements of patent infringement litigation on the ground that the settlements amounted to
collusive market sharing agreements. The most important area of case law on this matter today
4

See Cass and Hylton (2013) at 49-75.
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consists of reverse payment settlement cases. In the typical case, a pharmaceutical firm (pioneer
firm) sues a generic for infringement. The two firms enter into a settlement agreement in which
the pioneer pays the generic to stay off of the market until some date before the expiration of the
patent.
The Supreme Court held in FTC v. Actavis that such agreements may violate the antitrust laws
and should therefore be analyzed under the rule of reason. While this may seem to be
unexceptional at first glance, it was a substantial change of the pre-existing law. The rule in
effect before Actavis, the so-called “scope of the patent test,” immunized settlement agreements
from antitrust attack as long as the terms of the agreement did not effectively extend the duration
or scope of the patent. 5 The typical reverse payment settlement agreement, which generally
permit generic entry before expiration of the patent, would be lawful under the scope of the
patent test. Under Actavis, such an agreement would be upheld only if a court concluded that the
rule of reason balancing test indicated that the anticompetitive effects of the settlement were
outweighed by procompetitive benefits.
At present, the precise contours of Actavis’s rule of reason test are unclear. The most important
question in litigation currently is whether Actavis requires that the reverse payment be in cash for
its restrictions to apply. 6 If courts ultimately conclude that Actavis does not require a cash
transfer, then the rule’s scope will extend to a large set of patent infringement dispute
settlements, and perhaps nearly all. Few cash payments have been observed since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Actavis, reflecting the general awareness that antitrust litigation could easily
follow any cash settlement. However, patent infringement lawsuits continue to be settled, many
involving complicated deals. Still, since each of these deals arguably involves some transfer of
resources from the patentee to the generic (See Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharm., Inc., 994
(“But any settlement agreement can be characterized as involving ‘compensation’ to the
defendant, who would not settle unless he had something to show for the settlement. If any
settlement agreement is thus to be classified as involving a forbidden ‘reverse payment,’ we shall
have no more patent settlements.”) (emphasis in original)), each arguably falls under the
restrictions of Actavis. And since each settlement is arguably subject to scrutiny under Actavis,
each settlement could give rise to a challenge from a third party (or a federal enforcement
agency) based on Actavis.
In addition to the general possibility of an Actavis-based challenge to any settlement of a patent
infringement lawsuit in the pharmaceutical sector, the potential costs of such challenges are
advanced further by the unusual incentives of challengers. The patentee and generic, having
settled, have no interest in continuing litigation. The third-party challenger, by contrast, has no
interest in terminating litigation as long as (1) the potential payoff, in the form of a damages or
5

See, e.g., Cass and Hylton (2013) at 199.
Compare In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, 18 F. Supp. 3d 560, 569 (D. N.J. 2014) (refusing to
extend Actavis to include non-monetary payments) with In re Niaspan Antitrust Litigation, 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751
(E.D. Penn. 2014) (holding that “reverse payment” is not limited to a cash payment (citing Black’s Law Dictionary
1309 (10th ed. 2014))) and In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation, 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 543 (D. N.J. 2014) (holding that
non-monetary payments may trigger antitrust review but must be converted to a reliable estimate of its monetary
value in order to survive a motion to dismiss).
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settlement payment from the patentee and generic firms, is high (which is often true in
pharmaceutical patent litigation), and (2) a possibility exists that a court might find an antitrust
violation under the Actavis balancing test.
The characterization question that plagues so many of the recent decisions on the patent-antitrust
conflict is very much in evidence in Actavis. Viewing a patent as a monopoly, traditional
antitrust doctrine presumably would hold that the monopolist may exploit the patent in full
without violating the antitrust laws. 7 The decision to settle a patent infringement lawsuit along
terms that are consistent with the scope of the original patent is arguably just one of many ways
of exploiting the monopoly power of the patent. The decision to pay to settle a patent
infringement lawsuit is a decision to pay to eliminate a challenge to the title. It is, in effect, a
sale of a limited right in the patent itself to the challenger, which is a view that provides support
to the traditional scope-of-the patent test (overturned by Actavis). However, under the theory of
Actavis, a settlement is not properly viewed as a decision to sell a limited right in the patent, but
an agreement between two potential competitors to divide the market within the patent.
The characterization problem becomes obvious in the extreme scenarios. The view adopted by
Actavis would imply that any decision to sell a right in a patent to a potential competitor might
violate the antitrust laws. Indeed, the decision to sell the patent in full to a potential competitor
might violate the antitrust laws. Under this reasoning, any sale of a patent could be subjected to
antitrust scrutiny.

4. Conclusion
The aim of this short chapter is to explain the basic economics of the patent-antitrust conflict and
to illustrate its implications for antitrust law. This is a fertile source of litigation. The antitrust
laws are relatively clear, and patent rights have been clear for a long time. The conflicts arise
where courts have difficulty deciding which rights should dominate. The general trend over time
has been one of courts finding more ways in which antitrust laws control the rights of patentees.

7

See, e.g., Cass and Hylton (2013) at 188-192.
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